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DOES BOARD SIZE REALLY MATTER?
Evidence from Australia
Lukas Y. Setia-Atmaja
This study examines the impact of board size of Australian firms
on Tobin’s Q. Agency theory suggests that there is an inverse
relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q (Yermack 1996;
Eisenberg et al. 1998). The resource dependence argument, how-
ever, hypothesizes that larger boards can lead to higher perfor-
mance as the CEO’s need for advice is a function of the complexity
of the organization (Pfeffer 1972; Klein 1998). Analyzing a panel
data of 1,530 firm-year observations using random effects tech-
nique, this study finds a positive relationship between board size and
Tobin’s Q. The random effects regression results also reveal that the
positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q is driven by
firm size as this positive relationship is only found in larger firm
sample but not in the smaller firm sample. The overall results
support the resource dependence argument.
Keywords: advisory role; agency theory; board size; firm performance; firm size
JEL classifications: G30, G34
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Introduction
Corporations in most countries
have boards of directors specifically
responsible for representing sharehold-
ers’ interests. Traditionally, the board
has a legal responsibility for advising
and monitoring management, and con-
trolling companies on behalf of share-
holders. Its fiduciary responsibility
includes formulating corporate policy,
approving strategic plans, authorizing
major transactions and the sales of
additional securities, declaring divi-
dends, etc. Therefore, the board of
directors can play a significant role in
controlling agency problem, which is
the heart of corporate governance, par-
ticularly in monitoring executives
(Fama and Jensen 1983). The norma-
tive literature suggests that a board can
monitor its firm more closely and take
appropriate governance actions if it
has enough independent directors to
ensure effective monitoring (Jensen
1993).
Another characteristic perceived
to influence a board’s ability to moni-
tor is the size of the board. There are
two main reasons for this argument
(i.e., agency theory argument). First,
problems of communication and co-
ordination increase as board size in-
creases. Large boards can make coor-
dination, communication, and deci-
sion-making more cumbersome com-
pared to smaller boards (Jensen 1993).
In addition, within larger boards, some
directors tend to free-ride on the ef-
forts of others (Lipton and Lorsch
1992). Second, the effectiveness of
boards to control management or to
resist CEO control decreases as board
size increases. Jensen suggests that
larger boards lead to less candid dis-
cussion of managerial performance and
to greater control by the CEO.1 Alter-
natively, the argument of the advisory
role of the board (i.e., resource depen-
dence argument) suggests that larger
boards can lead to higher performance
as the CEO’s need for advice is a
function of the complexity of the orga-
nization (Pfeffer 1972; Booth and Deli
1996; Klein 1998).
Most of empirical literature sug-
gests that smaller boards are more ef-
fective in monitoring than larger board
(e.g., Yermack 1996; Eisenberg et al.
1998; Mak and Kusnadi 2005). How-
ever, more recently, Coles et al. (2008)
challenge the notion that limiting board
size will enhance firm value. They
find that Tobin’s Q increases with
board size for complex firms, and that
complex firms tend to have larger
boards.
This paper extends prior studies
by examining Australian firms. Evi-
dence on the relationship between
board size and firm performance has
been provided by Bonn et al. (2004),
who study firms in 1999. However,
major corporate collapses and scan-
1 Lipton and Lorsch (1992) further argue that boards of eight or nine members are most effective
in the U.S., while Jensen (1993) states that boards of more than seven or eight members function
less effectively.
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dals such as Ansett, OneTel and HIH,
have intensified the issue of corporate
governance in Australia since 2001.
Australia also provides a unique op-
portunity for corporate governance
research. Australia is a country con-
verging from a network-oriented cor-
porate governance system to a market-
oriented system.2 Prior work on this
issue has focused on countries with a
market-oriented system (e.g., Yermack
1996; Eisenberg et al. 1998) or coun-
tries with a network-oriented system
(e.g., Conyon and Peck 1998; Beiner
et al. 2004). Australia’s listed market
can be considered to be falling in be-
tween these two types of corporate
governance systems (Dignam and
Galanis 2004).3 Accordingly, the re-
sults of this research serve as a refer-
ence for improving corporate gover-
nance in countries which are in transi-
tion from a network-oriented system
to a market-oriented system.
Using a panel data on a sample of
Australian publicly listed firms over
the period 2000-2005, this study finds
a positive relationship between board
size and Tobin’s Q. The results also
reveal that the positive relationship
between board size and Tobin’s Q is
driven by firm size. That is, this posi-
tive relationship is only found in the
larger firm sample, but not in the
smaller firm sample. The overall re-
sults support the resource dependence
argument (Pfeffer 1972; Klein 1998).
The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 pro-
vides a literature review. Section 3
describes the data and research meth-
odology. Section 4 discusses the em-
pirical results; Section 5 concludes my
paper.
2 A network-oriented (insider) system is characterized by the relative unimportance of the
securities market as a source of corporate finance. The main sources are banks, families, non-
financial corporations and governments. The corporate shareholdings are more concentrated, and
both shareholders and creditors are more actively involved in the control of the companies (e.g.,
Japan and Germany). A market-oriented (outsider) system is characterized by a securities market
with dispersed shareholdings, where shareholders and companies interact on an ‘arm’s-length’
basis, largely determined by market forces (e.g., U.S. and U.K.) (Dignam and Galanis 2004: 623).
3 For example, in Australia, the market for corporate control is not as active as in the U.S. and,
thereby, its effectiveness in imposing on boards the responsibility to monitor and take corrective
actions is not as strong as in the U.S. (Suchard et al. 2001). The governance role of institutional
investors in Australia is also less significant than that in the U.S. (Stapledon 2006; Bonn et al. 2004
and Craswell et al. 1997) suggest that incentive-based compensation plays a less important role in
controlling agency problems among Australian firms. Australian corporate governance regulation
is also relatively flexible in nature and is enshrined in recommendations (i.e., the 2003 ASX
Corporate Governance Council Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations). In contrast, the U.S. has made its reforms mandatory through legislation (i.e.,
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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Board Size and Firm
Performance
A number of studies have at-
tempted to examine whether board size
has a significant impact on the effec-
tiveness of board’s monitoring. From
an agency theory perspective, Jensen
(1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
suggest that large boards can be a less
effective monitor than can small
boards. Yermack (1996) examine this
notion empirically and finds a nega-
tive relationship between Tobin’s Q
and board size for a sample of large
U.S. firms. Eisenberg et al. (1998)
replicate Yermack’s study using a
sample of small and medium-sized
Finnish firms. They argue that studies
of board-size effects in smaller firms
are beneficial because the driving fac-
tors for board-size effects may be dif-
ferent in large and small public firms.
For example, small and mid-sized firms
are frequently more closely-held, so
the impact of owner-manager agency
problems on decisions affecting board
size are less prevalent in this class of
firms. The authors find evidence con-
sistent with Yermack’s findings, sug-
gesting that problems in communica-
tion and coordination can be extended
to smaller and mid-sized firms. A nega-
tive relationship between board size
and firm value is also reported by
Conyon and Peck (1998) who examine
five European countries, and Mak and
Kusnadi (2005) who study Singapore
and Malaysia firms.
How do market participants view
the argument that smaller boards moni-
tor more effectively? Wu (2000) ex-
amine the evolution of board size over
the 1991-1995 period in the U.S. The
author finds that board size decreases
on average over this period and this is
partially caused by pressure from ac-
tive large shareholders such as
CALPERs.
These empirical findings raises a
question: if large boards are destruc-
tive to firm value, why do they still
exist? In addition, Hermalin and
Weisbach (2003) raise the issue of
whether an equilibrium phenomenon
or out-of-equilibrium situation is be-
ing estimated. The interpretation has
different implications for policy. For
example, it is believed that board size
is negatively related to firm perfor-
mance. The out-of-equilibrium inter-
pretation of this finding suggests that
limits on board size should be encour-
aged. In contrast, an equilibrium inter-
pretation implies that some other ex-
ogenous factors influence both board
size and profitability, and as a result,
such regulation is useless or even coun-
terproductive.
Moreover, several non-U.S. em-
pirical studies on this issue indicate
that board size has an insignificant
impact on firm performance. For ex-
amples, Beiner et al. (2004) who ex-
amine a sample of Swiss listed firms,
and Bonn (2004) who studies large
Australian firms. Therefore, the no-
tion that smaller boards are a better
monitor still needs further empirical
evidence.
The advisory role of the board has
received far less attention than their
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monitoring role. A number of litera-
ture, starting with Pfeffer (1972), sug-
gests that boards are appointed to maxi-
mize the provision of important re-
sources to the firm. Klein (1998), for
instance, suggests that the CEO’s need
for advice is a function of the complex-
ity of the organization. Moreover,
Coles et al. (2008) argue that firms
with greater advising requirements
(such as those diversified across in-
dustries), firms that rely on debt fi-
nancing, and larger firms are more
likely to benefit from a larger board.
They find that Tobin’s Q increases
with board size for complex firms (i.e.,
more diversified, larger, higher debt,
and higher R&D firms), and that com-
plex firms tend to have larger boards.
The results, thus, challenge the notion
that limiting board size will enhance
firm value.
Therefore to test the relationship
between board size and firm perfor-
mance, the author propose the follow-
ing null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: “Board size has an in-
significant impact on
firm performance in
Australia.”
Data and Research Method
Sample
This study examines annual panel
data over a six-year period from 2000
to 2005, an important period in Aus-
tralia that experienced vigorous de-
bate of corporate governance with the
redevelopment of the Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program (Audit
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill
in 2003 and the introduction of the
ASX Corporate Governance Council
Implementation Review Groups’ prin-
ciples on corporate governance in 2004.
The sample comprises firms listed on
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX)
on June 30, 1998 (i.e., 1,214 firms,
including data from 1998 to 1999).2
Financial firms (218 firms) are ex-
cluded because their dividend policies
are influenced by government regula-
tions (e.g., La Porta et al. 2000). The
sample is further restricted to firms
with annual reports available for 2000-
2005 (i.e., 140 firms are excluded) and
those firms that are eligible to pay
dividends (i.e., 540 firms are ex-
cluded).4 The final sample comprises
316 firms or 1,530 firm-year observa-
tions over a six-year period.
Model
Panel study methodology is uti-
lized as it provides more robust infor-
mation, more variability, less collinear-
ity among variables, more degrees of
freedom, and more efficiency (Baltagi,
1995). It also helps to control for unob-
served firm heterogeneity.
The model to estimate the impact
of board size on firm performance
takes the following form:
4 When a firm makes losses and has negative retained profits in a given year, it is legally unable
to pay dividends (Section 254T, Australian Corporations Act 2001).
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Tobin’s Qit = β0 + β1 Board sizeit +β2Debtit + β3 Firm sizeit +β4 Investmentit +
β5 Profitabilityit +
β6 Lag- Profitabilityit +β7 Firm ageit +
β8 Blockholdingsit +
β9 Business riskit +10
Industry it+β11-15 Year +
εit ............................(1)
The subscripts i and t represent
firm and year, respectively. The natu-
ral logarithm of Tobin’s Q is used to
measure firm performance (denoted
as Tobin’s Q). The actual definition of
Tobin’s Q is market value of the firm
divided by the replacement cost of
assets. However, as these replacement
costs (the denominator) are not avail-
able in Australia, Tobin’s Q is defined
as the market value of equity plus the
book value of all liabilities and prefer-
ence shares scaled by total assets.5
Board size is the key variable of inter-
est. Board size is measured by the
number of directors in the board. I also
control for variables that potentially
affect Tobin’s Q, such as debt, firm
size, investment, profitability, lag-prof-
itability, firm age, blockholdings, and
business risk.
Debt – Measured by book value of
debt divided by assets. From agency
theory perspective, in widely-held
firms, debt can serve as a disciplining
mechanism to contain agency prob-
lems between managers and dispersed
shareholders by imposing fixed obli-
gations on firm cash flows or by reduc-
ing free cash flows (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). There-
fore, a positive relationship between
debt and firm performance is expected.
In contrast, in closely-held firms, debt
can allow controlling insiders to con-
trol more resources without diluting
their voting rights and accordingly fa-
cilitate minority shareholders expro-
priation (Faccio et al. 2001). The gov-
ernance role of debt in closely-held
firms, therefore, depends upon the capi-
tal markets’ effectiveness in contain-
ing its abuse. When capital market
institutions are effective (i.e., corpo-
rate accounts are transparent and share-
holders and creditor rights are well
protected), higher debt levels may serve
to mitigate agency problems between
controlling and outside minority share-
holders). Since Australia has a strong
legal shareholder protection, debt is
expected to have a positive impact on
performance. Alternatively, from
trade-off theory perspective, debt in-
creases firm value as interest payments
reduce taxes. However, higher debt
will increase a firm’s bankruptcy costs.
Therefore, the firm should determine
the optimal level of capital structure.
A positive relationship between debt
and firm value indicates that the firm is
5 This proxy is highly correlated with the actual definition of Tobin’s Q and has been widely used
in U.S. studies (e.g., Loderer and Martin 1997; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). In Australia,
Craswell et al. (1997) also use the market-to-book (equity) ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s Q.
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using debt sub-optimally, while a nega-
tive relationship indicates that the firm
is using too much debt.
Firm size– Measured by natural
logarithm of total assets. From the
agency theory perspective, agency
problems and thus agency costs are
expected to increase in larger firms
(Barclay and Smith, 1995). Larger
firms also tend to have fewer growth
opportunities (Morck et al. 1988).
Therefore, a negative relationship be-
tween firm size and Tobin’s Q is ex-
pected. Alternatively, Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) argue that large firms
tend to have well established opera-
tions, and their performance is often
better than small firms.
Investment – Measured by capi-
tal expenditure scaled by assets. Firms
with lower investment tend to have
fewer growth opportunities (Morck et
al. 1988). Thus, a positive relationship
between investment and Tobin’s Q is
expected.
Profitability – Measured by earn-
ings after tax scaled by assets (ROA)
and Lag-Profitability – Measured by
previous year’s ROA. On the basis of
simple valuation model, it is reason-
able to expect that accounting profit-
ability (measured by return on assets)
is positively related to Tobin’s Q as
profit is the main source of firm’s cash
flows and thus firm value (Beiner et al.
2004).
Firm age – Measured by natural
logarithm of the number of years since
the firm’s incorporation. Pham (2003)
suggests that firm age affects Tobin’s
Q. Ritter (1991) shows that over-opti-
mism is greater for younger firms,
suggesting a negative relationship be-
tween firm age and Tobin’s Q.
Mikkelson et al. (1997) report that the
number of years of operating history is
a significant determinant of post-list-
ing performance.
Blockholdings – Measured by ag-
gregate fractional holdings of share-
holders, holding at least five percent of
the firm’s shares. Agency theory sug-
gests that large shareholders can play
an important role in monitoring man-
agers, and thus minimizing agency
costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Therefore, firms that have large share-
holders or those with higher owner-
ship concentration may outperform
other firms. However, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) remind us that large
controlling shareholders may have an
incentive and the ability to extract pri-
vate benefits at the expense of minor-
ity shareholders, suggesting a nega-
tive relationship between ownership
concentration and Tobin’s Q. Empiri-
cal studies have produced mixed find-
ings on the relationship between own-
ership concentration and firm perfor-
mance. A positive relationship has been
found by, for example, Mehran (1995)
and Ang et al. (2000), whereas an
insignificant relationship has been
found by, for example, Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) and Agrawal and Knoeber
(1996).
Business risk – Measured by stan-
dard deviation of EBIT (earnings be-
fore interest and taxes) in the previous
five years. It is widely believed that
risk and return are positively related;
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therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that business risk is positively associ-
ated with firm performance. Alterna-
tively, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ar-
gue that low-risk firms tend to have
well established operations, and their
profitability and thus performance are
often better than those of high-risk
firms. Although the latter may have
better growth potential, they incur com-
paratively more expenses in building
up their businesses.
To address industry and time varia-
tions, the panel data regression can be
extended to include fixed industry ef-
fects and fixed time effects; the former
accounts for variation in dependent
variables due to industry differences,
while the latter removes secular ef-
fects among the independent variables.
An industry dummy variable is used
and takes the value of one if the firm is
in an “opaque industry” (i.e., difficult
to monitor) and zero if the firm is in a
“transparent industry” (i.e., easy to
monitor). This approach follows
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) and is
appropriate as the focus of this study is
the monitoring role of dividends.
Zeckhauser and Pound classify their
U.S. sample of 22 industries according
to information and asset structure of
the industry proxied by R&D scaled
by sales. They assume that the higher
the R&D intensity of firms in the in-
dustry, the more closed is the informa-
tion structure, and the more difficult it
would be to subject such firms to out-
side monitoring. Alternatively, dummy
variables based on six-digit GICS in-
dustry classifications are used as a
robustness check of this study. 20
dummy variables are used to represent
21 industry classifications in order to
avoid perfect multicollinearity. Simi-
larly, as the sample comprises six years
of observations, five-year dummy vari-
ables are used in the second fixed
effects model.
Results
Descriptive statistics for all vari-
ables used in the model is presented in
Table 1.
The average number of directors
in the board is six. The average block-
holdings (i.e., shareholders with more
than five per cent equity stake) are
44.6 percent, which suggests that Aus-
tralian firms have relatively concen-
trated ownership.
Table 2a reports various Pearson
product moment correlation coeffi-
cients among variables used in this
study. It indicates that correlations
among independent or firm character-
istic variables are generally low. The
maximum magnitude of the correla-
tion coefficient among the indepen-
dent variables is around 0.66 (i.e., the
correlation between firm size and board
size), suggesting that multicollinearity
is not a potential threat when conduct-
ing multiple regression analyses. In
addition, this study conducts multi-
collinearity test using variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) method. Table 2b
shows that all variables in Equation
(1) have VIF less than 10 (i.e., between
1 and 2.4), indicating that multi-col-
linearity is not a big threat.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Min. Max.
Dev.
Tobin’s Q -0.022 -0.078 0.555 -1.724 2.759
Board size 6.08 6.00 2.10 3 15
Total debt / Assets 0.227 0.222 0.171 0 1.448
Total assets (A$ million) 1.15 b 1.12b 3.59b 0.9m 5.52b
Firm age 34.02 21.00 28.24 3 168
Capital expenditure/Assets 0.063 0.039 0.074 0 0.587
Net income/ Assets 0.055 0.053 0.103 -1.36 0.840
Lag (Net income/Assets) 0.039 0.037 0.138 -2.11 0.750
% of blockholdings 0.446 0.441 0.237 0 1
Number of observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1530
* This indicates proportion of firms, rather than the mean proportion for associated
variable.
The author also conducts tests on
other classical assumptions for linear
regression, such as normality, auto-
correlation, and heteroskedasticity.
The author uses the Shapiro-Wilk W
statistic to test the normality of the
residual in Equation (1). The author
finds that the model barely fulfills the
normality assumption at the conven-
tional level (W= 0.96, p > 0.05). With
regard to autocorrelation, The author
uses the Wooldridge test for auto-
correlation in panel data (Wooldridge
2002: 282-283), and finds first-order
auto-correlation in the panel data (F =
108.80; p < 0.01). Finally, the author
conduct the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity,
and finds a relatively constant vari-
ance (Chi square = 2.54; p > 0.10).6
Therefore, this study uses Huber-White
Sandwich estimator (cluster) for vari-
ance to calculate pooled regression
standard errors. This estimator pro-
vides robust standard errors in the pres-
ence of violations of regression model
assumptions such as heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation (Wooldridge
2002).
Table 3 presents the proportion of
independent directors and board size
across industries measured by four digit
6The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data is calculated based on the random effects
(panel) estimation. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity is calculated
based on the OLS estimation. The results tests of classical assumptions for linear regression are not
presented in order to preserve space, but they are available by emailing the author.
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GICS code. In Table 3, the statistical
tests strongly indicate that board size
is not identical across industries (i.e.,
ANOVA = 9.94; p < 0.01 and Kruskal
Wallis = 157.68; p < 0.01). Several
industries such as foods and staples
retailing, pharmaceutical and biotech-
nology, and transportation have rela-
tively larger boards. In contrast, sev-
eral industries such as real estate, capi-
tal goods, household and personal
products, and consumer services tend
to have significantly smaller boards.
In addition, firms operating in
transparent industries have signifi-
cantly larger boards than firms in
opaque industries (6.22 versus 5.89
directors). This difference is statisti-
cally significant at the conventional
level (i.e., t-statistic = 2.95; p < 0.01
and Mann Whitney U test = -3.09; p <
0.01). Therefore, it is important to
control for industry effect in the analy-
sis.
Table 4 shows the dynamics of
board size and Tobin’s Q. With re-
spect to board structure, the statistical
tests indicate strongly that board size
of Australian firms are relatively stable
over time (i.e., ANOVA = 9.94; p
<0.01 and Kruskal-Wallis = 157.68; p
< 0.01). With regard to Tobin’s Q, the
non-parametric test indicates that Aus-
tralian firm performance is relatively
unstable over time (i.e., Kruskal-Wallis
= 157.68; p < 0.01), but parametric test
indicates that it is relatively stable
over time (i.e., ANOVA = 9.94; p
<0.01).
Table 5 shows the relationship
between board size and firm value of
this study’s sample without consider-
ing other variables that may also affect
firm value.
The result seems not to support
the notion that firms with larger boards
tend to have lower values (Yermack
1996). Specifically, mean Tobin’s Q
increases until it reaches a maximum
at a board size of eight, then decreases
for a board size of nine. It increases
again for a board size of 10, then
decreases for larger board size. There-
fore, an optimal board size of Austra-
lian listed firms is from eight to 10.
This is consistent with Lipton and
Lorsch (1992) who find that boards
with eight or nine members are most
effective in U.S. The result is not con-
sistent with Mak and Kusnadi (2005)
who find that boards of five members
are most effective in Singapore and
Malaysia. But this study’s result, as
Table 2b. Variance Inflation Factors
Variable VIF
Board size 1.88
Debt 1.20
Firm size 2.41
Business risk 1.38
Firm age 1.10
Blockholdings 1.15
Profitability 1.14
Lag(Profitability) 1.15
Investment 1.05
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Table 3. Board Size by Industry
GICS INDUSTRY GROUP† No Board Size
Code
Transparent Industries
1010 Energy 84 5.61
2020 Commercial services & Supplies 72 6.86
2030 Transportation 74 6.47
2510 Automobiles & components 44 5.90
2520 Consumer durables & apparels 35 5.77
2530 Consumer services 60 5.26
2540 Media 103 6.72
2550 Retailing 96 6.29
3010 Foods & staples retailing 30 9.06
3020 Food, beverage & tobacco 136 6.22
3030 Household & personal products 3 5.33
4040 Real estate†† 125 5.26
5010 Telecommunication services 6 7.33
5010 Utilities 26 7.80
Opaque Industries
1510 Materials 309 5.76
2010 Capital Goods 195 5.72
3510 Health care equipment & services 68 6.69
3520 Pharmaceutical & biotechnology 10 6.90
4510 Software & services 30 6.10
4520 Tech. Hardware & equipment 21 6.28
4530 Semi conductor & equipment 3 5.00
ANOVA††† 9.947 ***
Kruskal-Wallis 157.68 ***
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Continued from Table 3
GICS INDUSTRY GROUP† No Board Size
Code
Transparent Industries 894 6.22
Opaque Industries 636 5.89
Difference 0.33
t - statistic 2.959 ***
Mann Whitney U test -3.039 ***
†  Excludes Banks (4010), Diversified Financials (4020) and Insurance (4030).
†† Includes only Real Estate Management and Development (GICS code 40401020).
††† Includes only industry groups having at least 10 observations. If all industry groups are
included in the analysis, the ANOVA F-statistics for proportion of independent directors
and board size are 4.692 and 8.684, respectively; and significant at the 0.01 level. In
addition, Scheffe’s post hoc tests were conducted to establish differences among indus-
tries.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 4. The Dynamics of Board Size and Tobin’s Q by Time
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 ANOVA Kruskal
Wallis
Board size 6.1358 6.1673 6.0480 6.0352 6.0651 6.0376 0.183 6.662
Tobin’s Q 1.1471 1.1477 1.1538 1.0983 1.2245 1.2223 0.611 38.579***
 *** Significant at the 0.01 level.
Board Observations Tobin’s Q
Size (mean)
3 133 0.872
4 225 1.082
5 300 1.123
6 287 1.159
Table 5. Tobin’s Q and Board Size
Board Observations Tobin’s Q
Size (mean)
7 250 1.158
8 132 1.618
9 95 1.157
10 44 1.532
>=11 53 1.248
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well as Lipton and Lorsch’s and Mak
and Kusnadi’s, should be interpreted
carefully as they fail to control for
other variables that potentially affect
Tobin’s Q.
Table 6 shows the pooled regres-
sion estimation for the relationship
between board size and Tobin’s Q.
The author uses the Huber-White Sand-
wich estimator (cluster) for variance
Table 6. Pooled Regression (Huber-White) Estimations of Board Size and
Tobin’s Q
Variable All Firms Large Firms Small Firms
Board size 0.046*** 0.047** 0.043**
(2.86) (2.29) (2.16)
Debt 0.118 0.243 0.333***
(1.02) (1.22) (3.27)
Firm Size 0.009 -0.123*** -0.131***
(0.53)   (-3.44) (-4.60)
Investment 1.073*** 0.392 1.238***
(4.66) (1.09) (5.34)
Profitability 1.819*** 2.119*** 1.149***
(5.97) (3.51) (5.55)
Lag (Profitability) 0.400** 2.119*** 0.343***
(2.24) (3.51) (2.62)
Firm age -0.081*** -0.103*** -0.049
(-2.99) (-3.11) (-1.32)
Blockholdings -0.270*** -0.220* -0.225**
(-2.76) (-1.78) (-2.17)
Business risk 0.000 0.001** 0.006**
(1.36) (2.66) (2.21)
Industry Dummy -0.039 -0.098 -0.091
(-0.80) (-1.46) (-0.61)
Year Dummy Included Included Included
Number of
observations 1530 765 765
Adjusted R2 0.238 0.275 0.231
F-test 13.43*** 7.45*** 8.92***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; **   Significant at the 0.05 level; *     Significant at the 0.10 level
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to calculate pooled regression stan-
dard errors. This estimator provides
robust standard errors in the presence
of violations of regression model as-
sumptions such as heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation (Wooldridge
2002). The technique is appropriate
when panel data have a large number
of subjects (i.e., firms), but a relatively
small number of observations per sub-
ject.
Column 1 of Table 6 shows the
regression estimation for all firms. The
coefficient on board size is positive
and significant at the conventional level
(coefficient = 0.046, p < 0.01). This
suggests that larger boards lead to
higher values, and this does not sup-
port Hypothesis 1. This is consistent
with Coles et al. (2008), and chal-
lenges the notion that limiting board
size will enhance firm value. With
regard to control variables, coefficients
on investments, profitability, and lag
(profitability) are positive and signifi-
cant at the conventional level, suggest-
ing that firms with higher investment
and profitability are valued higher by
market participants. This is consistent
with Morck et al. (1988) and Beiner et
al. (2004). In addition, coefficients on
firm age and blockholdings are nega-
tive and significant at the conventional
level, indicating that younger firms
and firms with lower ownership con-
centration outperform other firms.
Result for firm age is consistent with
Ritter (1991), showing that over-opti-
mism is greater for younger firms.
Result for blockholdings is consistent
with the notion that large shareholders
may expropriate minority sharehold-
ers, lowering the market value of the
firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
There is an argument that due to
limited budget or less complexity,
smaller firms tend to have fewer direc-
tors in the boards. Larger firms are also
likely to have more external contract-
ing relationships and, thus, require
larger boards (Pfeffer 1972; Booth and
Deli 1996; Coles 2008). In our sample,
board size is positively correlated with
firm size (coefficient of correlation =
0.668, see Table 2a). To examine
whether firm size has an impact on the
result shown in column 1, this study
divides sample equally into larger and
smaller firms based on total assets, and
re-estimates random effects regres-
sions for those subsamples.
The results presented in columns
2 and 3 of Table 6 reveal that the
positive relationship between board
size and Tobin’s Q is not driven by
firm size. The coefficient on board
size for large firm sample remains posi-
tive and significant in large (coeffi-
cient = 0.047, p < 0.05) and small
firms (coefficient = 0.043, p < 0.05).
Pooled data regressions, however,
do not consider the possibility that a
spurious relationship exists between
independent and dependent variables
due to the lack of inclusion of unmea-
sured explanatory variables that affect
firm behavior. This may result in bi-
ased estimates. The panel data method
addresses the unobserved omitted vari-
able bias by modeling a different inter-
cept for each cross-sectional unit. Two
techniques can be used to incorporate
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different intercepts in the model (see
Kennedy 2003: 303-307). First, the
impact of unobserved variables on the
dependent variable can be accommo-
dated by introducing a different inter-
cept for each cross-sectional unit (i.e.,
firm). This can be achieved by model-
ing a dummy variable for each firm
(and omit the intercept), which results
in a fixed effects estimator (referred to
as fixed effects regression). The fixed
effects model, however, has two major
drawbacks: (1) by implicitly including
a substantial number of dummy vari-
ables, the degrees of freedom of the
model are reduced significantly, and
(2) the transformation involved in this
estimation process eliminates all ex-
planatory variables that do not vary
within an individual (i.e., a time-in-
variant variable such as gender).
An alternative method is to treat
different intercepts for each subject
randomly, thereby including the inter-
cept as a component of the error term
(referred to as the random effects re-
gression). This method is designed to
overcome the two drawbacks of the
fixed effects model. The procedure
views the different intercepts as hav-
ing been drawn from a pool of possible
intercepts. Thus, they can be consid-
ered random (and usually assumed to
be normally distributed) and part of
the error term. As a result, the specifi-
cation has an overall intercept, a set of
explanatory variables, and a compos-
ite error term. The latter consists of
two parts: the random intercept term,
which measures the extent to which
this individual’s intercept differs from
the overall intercept, and the tradi-
tional random error, which indicates
random deviation for a firm in a certain
time period. The random effects model
does not reduce the degrees of free-
dom, and thus produces a more effi-
cient estimator of the slope coeffi-
cients than does the fixed effects model.
In addition, the transformation used
for the random effects estimation pro-
cedure does not eliminate time-invari-
ant explanatory variables. Therefore,
this study uses random effects regres-
sion to estimate Equation (1).
Table 7 shows the random effects
regression estimation for the relation-
ship between board size and Tobin’s
Q. Column 1 of Table 7 shows the
regression estimation for all firms.
Consistent with the analysis of pooled
(Huber-White) regressions presented
in column 1 of Table 6, there appears
a significant positive impact of board
size on Tobin’s Q, suggesting that
larger boards lead to higher values
(coefficient = 0.021, p < 0.01). This is
consistent with Coles et al. (2008), and
challenges the notion that limiting
board size will enhance firm value. As
such, the result does not support Hy-
pothesis 1. With regard to control vari-
ables, Tobin’s Q seems to be posi-
tively related to investments, profit-
ability, and lag (profitability), and
negatively associated with firm age
and blockholdings. As such, the re-
sults are consistent with the analysis of
pooled regressions presented in col-
umn 1 of Table 6.
347
Setia-Atmaja—Does Board Size Really Matter?
Table 7. Random Effects Regression Estimations of Board Size and Tobin’s
Q
Variable All Firms Large Firms Small Firms
Board size 0.021** (3.52) 0.014
(2.41) 0.034*** (1.13)
Debt 0.048 0.011 0.376***
(0.53) (0.08) (3.55)
Firm Size 0.003 -0.053** -0.119***
(0.23)   (-2.19) (-4.99)
Investment 0.969*** 0.594*** 1.091***
(6.68) (2.65) (6.35)
Profitability 1.025*** 1.165*** 0.616***
(9.61) (7.61) (5.09)
Lag (Profitability) 0.188*** 0.544*** 0.161**
(2.65) (3.80) (2.02)
Firm age -0.006** -0.078*** -0.044
(-2.15) (-1.96) (-1.22)
Blockholdings -0.145** -0.227*** -0.158*
(-2.10) (-2.56) (-1.80)
Business risk 0.000 0.000** 0.005*
(1.49) (2.08) (1.67)
Industry Dummy -0.044 -0.098 -0.076
(-0.89) (-1.46) (-1.38)
Year Dummy Included Included Included
Number of observations 1530 765 765
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.224 0.204
Wald Chi-Square 260.73*** 143.11*** 127.27***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; **   Significant at the 0.05 level; *     Significant at the 0.10 level
To examine whether firm size has
an impact on the result shown in col-
umn 1, this study divides sample
equally into larger and smaller firms
based on total assets, and re-estimates
random effects regressions for those
subsamples. The results presented in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 reveal that
the positive relationship between board
size and Tobin’s Q is driven by larger
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firms. The coefficient on board size
for large firm sample remains positive
and significant (coefficient = 0.034, p
< 0.01). The coefficient on board size
for small firm sample, however, is
positive but insignificant at the con-
ventional level (coefficient = 0.014, p
> 0.10). In addition, for large firm
sample, the author find that Tobin’s Q
is negatively related to firm size, firm
age, and ownership concentration, and
positively related to investment, prof-
itability, lag (profitability), and busi-
ness risk. This is consistent with the
analysis of all firm sample, except for
firm size and business risk, that is, for
all firm sample, both variables are
statistically insignificant but become
significant for large sample firms. It
seems that, among large sample firms,
smaller and riskier firms outperform
other firms. In small firm sample,
Tobin’s Q is negatively related to firm
size and ownership concentration, and
positively related to debt, investment,
profitability, lag (profitability) and
business risk. This is consistent with
the analysis of all firm sample, except
for debt and business risk. It seems that
smaller firms with lower debt and
higher risk outperform other firms.
Several analyses were conducted
as robustness tests. First, our sample
and data are potentially contaminated
by Australia’s 2003 corporate gover-
nance reforms since our data begin in
2000. To examine whether our results
are sensitive to this reform, the author
divide the data into two groups (2000-
2003 and 2004-2005) and examine for
any differences. The results are simi-
lar to those reported, except that the
positive impact of family control on
debt becomes less significant in the
2004-2005 group.
Second, test the sensitivity of our
findings to the presence of outliers and
influential observations by truncating
the largest one to five percent prob-
ability levels for each tail of the distri-
bution for the model variables. In gen-
eral, the results are not substantially
different from earlier analyses.
Third, reestimate Equation (1)
using log nature board size (ln board
size) instead of board size to increase
the normality of board size variable.
The author still get a positive relation-
ship between board size and firm per-
formance.
Finally, a six-digit Global Indus-
try Classification Standard (GICS) is
used to control for industry differ-
ences instead of a dummy variable for
transparent versus opaque sector. Al-
though some industry observations
prove relatively small, the results are
similar to those reported in Table 6.
So, different industries do not change
my findings.
Conclusion
This study examines the impact of
board size of Australian firms on
Tobin’s Q. There have been two con-
flicting arguments on the relationship
between firm performance and board
size. On the one hand, agency theory
suggests that there is an inverse rela-
tionship between board size and
Tobin’s Q (Yermack 1996; Eisenberg
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et al. 1998). Earlier empirical evidence
in several countries generally supports
this argument. On the other hand, the
resource dependence argument hypoth-
esizes that larger boards can lead to
higher performance as the CEO’s need
for advice is a function of the complex-
ity of the organization (Pfeffer 1972;
Klein 1998). Using a panel data of
1,530 firm-year observations, the
univariate analysis indicates that an
optimal board size of Australian listed
firms is from eight to 10, which is
above the sample average of six direc-
tors. Consistently, controlling for vari-
ables that potentially affect Tobin’s Q,
the multivariate analysis finds that
larger boards lead to higher Tobin’s Q,
especially among larger firms. There-
fore, my findings provide support for
the resource dependence argument.
These findings justify initiatives to
encourage more directors in boards
who could provide advice for CEOs,
especially in large and complex firms.
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Appendix
Variable Description
Primary Variables
Board Size The number of directors on the board
Tobin’s Q The natural log of market to book value of assets
ratio
Control Variables
Debt The book value of debt divided by assets
Firm Size The natural logarithm of total assets
Business Risk The standard deviation of EBIT in the previous five
years
Blockholdings The aggregate ownership of shareholders holding
5% or more equity
Investment Capital expenditure scaled by assets
Firm Age The natural logarithm of the number of years since
the firm’s incorporation
Profitability Earnings after tax scaled by assets (ROA)
Lag (Profitability) Previous year’s ROA
Industry A dummy variable, based on two digit GICS codes,
which equals one for “opaque industries” and zero
for “transparent industries”
